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QUANTUM HUMEANISM, OR: PHYSICALISM WITHOUT
PROPERTIES
By Michael Esfeld
In the recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism: Lewis’s
thesis of Humean supervenience can be literally true even in the light of quantum entanglement. This
point has so far been made with respect to Bohm’s quantum theory. Against this background, this paper
seeks to achieve the following four results: (1) to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from
Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general; (2) to show that this option applies also
to classical mechanics; (3) to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no
commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties); (4) to point out that by removing the
commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and
humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For a long time, it was thought that quantum entanglement refutes
Humeanism, in particular David Lewis’s thesis of Humean supervenience (e.g.,
Lewis 1986: introduction), because the entangled wavefunctions of quantum
systems are not compatible with an ontology that admits only local matters of
particular fact. That incompatibility was supposed to follow from Bell’s theo-
rem (Bell 1964, reprinted in Bell 1987: ch. 2) and the subsequent experiments
(e.g., Aspect, Dalibard and Roger 1982).
Thus, Teller (1986) claimed that quantum entanglement requires recog-
nizing relations that do not supervene on the local matters of particular fact
and thereby rules out local physicalism. Teller’s non-supervenient relations
were later spelled out in terms of ontic structural realism, and Teller’s view of
these relations being instantiated by individuals was abandoned: the entangled
wavefunctions of quantum systems were seen as committing us to an ontology
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of concrete physical structures in the sense of relations that (a) do not super-
vene on intrinsic properties of their relata and that, moreover, (b) do not even
require that their relata have an intrinsic identity at all (e.g., Ladyman 1998;
French and Ladyman 2003; Esfeld 2004). Furthermore, these structures were
considered to be modal, establishing connections in nature that are in any case
more than mere contingent regularities, if not outright necessary connections.
Consequently, quantum entanglement was considered as refuting not only the
idea of an ontology that admits only local matters of particular fact, but also
the core tenet of any form of Humeanism, namely to eschew a commitment to
objective modality (see Ladyman and Ross 2007: chs 2–5; see notably Maudlin
2007: ch. 2, in particular 51–64; Esfeld 2009; French 2014: chs 9–11 on modal
structures). The commitment to only local matters of particular fact follows
from the intention to do without objective modality: maintaining that nature
is nothing more than a mosaic of local matters of particular fact is the most
straightforward way to avoid any sort of a commitment to modal connections
in nature.
Philosophers with a favourable attitude towards Humeanism reacted to
this situation by trying to adapt Humeanism so that quantum entanglement
is taken into account. The most important suggestion in this respect is to
admit irreducible relations over and above the spatio-temporal relations to
the ontological ground floor of Humeanism (Darby 2012) and to envisage
developing a Humean version of ontic structural realism on the basis of in-
cluding such relations (Lyre 2010). However, recognizing irreducible relations
of quantum entanglement considerably restricts free combinatorialism and
arguably implies a commitment to some sort of objective modality, since these
relations tie the temporal development of—in the last resort all—quantum
systems together, whatever their spatial distance may be. Thus, considering
the experiment of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935) in the version of Bohm
(1951: 611–22), if in one wing of the experiment the measured quantum system
behaves in such a way that the measurement outcome is spin up, then it is
necessarily so that in the other wing of the experiment the measured quantum
system behaves in such a way that the measurement outcome is spin down.
Consequently, if there are relations of quantum entanglement in the superve-
nience base, these relations pose a constraint on what can and what cannot
happen elsewhere in space–time.
Furthermore, in order to rescue Humeanism, one may suggest that the very
high dimensional configuration space of the universe is the realm of physical
reality (Loewer 1996) (if there are N particles in three-dimensional space, the
dimension of the corresponding configuration space is 3N). Hence, in this
case, the physical world is not situated in a three-dimensional space or a four-
dimensional space–time, but plays itself out in a very high dimensional space. If
one makes this move, there is no problem for Humeanism, since the quantum
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mechanical wavefunction can be considered as a field in configuration space,
assigning values to the points of that space that can be regarded as intrinsic
properties occurring at the points of that space. Moreover, the development
of the wavefunction is local in that space, as long as it is given by a linear
dynamical equation (such as the Schro¨dinger equation) (see Albert 1996 and
2013 as well as Ney 2010: section 3.3).
However, this adaptation implies taking what is usually introduced as
a mathematical space representing the physical reality—with each point of
3N-dimensional configuration space representing a possible configuration of
N particles in three-dimensional space—to be itself the physical reality. Note
that this suggestion is different from the proposals put forward in the context of
the search for a quantum theory of gravity according to which physical space
may have more than four dimensions (as, e.g., in string theory): these proposals
do not call into question the contrast between a configuration space as a math-
ematical space employed to represent the physical reality and physical space,
even if physical space should turn out to be different from what is currently
presupposed in quantum field theory or general relativity theory. Configura-
tion space realism therefore entails that one has to give up a central tenet not
only of common sense realism, but also of all working science, namely the one
of a distinction between a mathematical space that is employed to represent
physical reality and the space in which physical reality is situated. One can
argue that this tenet should be given up only as a last resort (Monton 2006).
Fortunately for the Humean, in recent years, it has become clear that no
such adaptation is necessary. Humeanism is not refuted by quantum physics.
More precisely, Lewis’s thesis of Humean supervenience can be literally true
even in the light of the empirical evidence for quantum entanglement. The
background that enables Humeanism to stand firm is the development of
what is known as primitive ontology theories of quantum physics. The term
‘primitive ontology’ goes back to Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zanghı` (2013: ch. 2,
end of section 2, originally published in 1992). Attention has been focused in
recent years on the structure of these theories, following notably the paper by
Allori et al. (2008): the primitive ontology consists in the distribution of matter
in three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space–time; that distribution
is the referent of the formalism of quantum physics. Furthermore, a law is
admitted as that what fixes (in a probabilistic or a deterministic manner)
the temporal development of the distribution of matter in physical space,
given an initial configuration of matter. That’s all. In particular, the quantum
mechanical wavefunction is part and parcel of the law instead of being a
physical entity on a par with the primitive ontology.
The primitive ontology is in any case constituted by local matters of par-
ticular fact—‘local beables’ to use Bell’s famous neologism (Bell 1987: ch. 7)
(‘beable’ standing for what there is by contrast to ‘observable’, i.e., what can be
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observed). The only move that the Humean has to make then is this: instead of
admitting the law as an entity that exists in addition to and independently of
the primitive ontology, governing or guiding the temporal development of the
primitive ontology, the Humean has to regard the law as supervening on the
distribution of matter throughout the whole of space–time, that is, the entire
mosaic of ‘local beables’ or local matters of particular fact. This move has
been made with respect to Bohm’s quantum theory in the recent literature
(Callender unpublished; Esfeld et al. 2013: section 3; Miller 2013).
Against the background of this state of the art in the recent literature, the
aim of the present paper is to achieve the following four results:
1. to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohm’s quan-
tum theory to primitive ontology theories of quantum physics in general
(Section II);1
2. to show that this option is applicable not only to quantum physics, but also
to classical mechanics (Section III);
3. to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but
no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties) (end
of Section II);
4. to point out that by removing the commitment to natural properties, the
stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and
humility no longer apply (Section IV).
In a nutshell, far from refuting Humeanism, quantum physics strengthens
Humeanism as a stance in the metaphysics of science. The only amendment
that the Humean has to make is to endorse a commitment to primitive stuff
instead of intrinsic properties occurring at space–time points.
II. HUMEANISM AND THE PRIMITIVE ONTOLOGY
OF QUANTUM PHYSICS
There are three elaborate primitive ontology theories of quantum mechan-
ics. The de Broglie–Bohm theory, going back to de Broglie (1928) and Bohm
(1952), is the oldest of them. Its dominant contemporary version is known as
Bohmian mechanics (Du¨rr et al. 2013). This theory endorses particles as the
primitive ontology, maintaining that there is at any time one configuration
of particles localized in three-dimensional space, with the particles moving
on continuous trajectories in space. Bohmian mechanics therefore needs two
laws: the guiding equation fixing the temporal development of the position
of the particles and the Schro¨dinger equation determining the temporal de-
velopment of the universal wavefunction, that is, the wavefunction of all the
1 Callender (unpublished b) also makes that point.
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particles in the universe. These two laws are linked in this way: the role of the
universal wavefunction, developing according to the Schro¨dinger equation, is
to determine the velocity of each particle at any time t given the position of all
the particles at t.
Furthermore, there are two primitive ontology theories using the dynamics
proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986), which seeks to include the
textbooks’ postulate of the collapse of the wavefunction upon measurement
into a modified Schro¨dinger equation. Employing this dynamics, Ghirardi
et al. (1995) developed an ontology of a continuous matter density distribution
in physical space: the wavefunction in configuration space and its temporal
development as described by the GRW equation represent at any time the
density of matter in physical space, such that there is at any time a certain
matter density instantiated at the points of physical space. The spontaneous
localization of the wavefunction in configuration space (its collapse) represents
a spontaneous contraction of the matter density in physical space, thus ac-
counting for measurement outcomes and well-localized macrophysical objects
in general (see Monton 2004 for details).
The other theory goes back to Bell (1987: ch. 22): whenever there is a
spontaneous localization of the wavefunction in configuration space, that de-
velopment of the wavefunction in configuration space represents an event
occurring at a point in physical space. These point events are today known as
flashes; the term ‘flash’ was introduced by Tumulka (2006: p. 826). According
to the GRW flash theory, the flashes are all that exists in space–time. Conse-
quently, the temporal development of the wavefunction in configuration space
does not represent the distribution of matter in physical space. It represents
the objective probabilities for the occurrence of further flashes, given an initial
configuration of flashes. There thus is no continuous distribution of matter in
physical space, namely no trajectories or worldlines of particles, and no field—
such as a matter density field—either. There only is a sparse distribution of
single events in space–time.
These theories hence put forward different proposals about the nature of
matter, which cover the main metaphysical conceptions of matter—particles,
gunk, single events. That notwithstanding, their structure is the same: they
consist in a proposal for a primitive ontology of matter distributed in physical
space and a law for its temporal development (see Allori et al. 2008). The
proponents of these theories tend to regard the universal wavefunction as
nomological—that is, as part of the law—instead of considering it as a physical
entity that exists in physical space in addition to the primitive ontology (see
notablyDu¨rr et al. 2013: chs 11.5 and 12). The reason for adopting a nomological
stance with respect to the universal wavefunction is that it cannot be conceived
as a wave or field in physical space: it does not have values at the points of
physical space. If it is a wave or a field, it can be a wave or field only in
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configuration space, that is, the very high dimensional mathematical space
each point of which corresponds to a possible configuration of matter in
physical space.
Nonetheless, the proponents of these theories are inclined to consider the
law—and in particular the universal wavefunction—as an entity that exists
in addition to the primitive ontology, being some sort of a ‘non-local beable’
that there is over and above the ‘local beables’ which constitute the primitive
ontology (see again Du¨rr et al. 2013: chs 11.5 and 12). Themain reason for doing
so is that the primitive ontology is not sufficient to determine the universal
wavefunction: there can be two or more identical initial universal configura-
tions of particles, matter density or flashes and yet different wavefunctions of
these configurations, leading to different temporal developments of them.
However, the Humean does not claim that the laws of nature supervene on
the local matters of particular fact at a given time. The Humean claim is that
the laws of nature supervene on the entire distribution of the local matters
of particular fact throughout the whole of space–time. In other words, the
laws of nature are not fixed when there is the initial configuration of local
matters of particular fact; they are determined only at the end of the world so
to speak (see, e.g., Beebee and Mele 2002: 201–5). Accordingly, the Humean
claim is that the universal wavefunction is determined only by the distribution
of the particle positions, the matter density or the flashes throughout the
whole of space and time. Whereas it is not an option to hold that the universal
wavefunction supervenes on the configuration of the local matters of particular
fact at any given time, it is an option to maintain that it supervenes on the
local matters of particular fact throughout the whole of space and time.2 If
the entire distribution of the local matters of particular fact were still to leave
room for different universal wavefunctions, that difference would not make
any empirical difference and could therefore be regarded by the Humean as
a mathematical surplus structure.
In making this move, the Humean has to give up the idea that the universal
wavefunction guides or pilots the temporal development of the configuration
of matter in space. The Humean can invoke a good reason for abandoning
that idea: since the universal wavefunction cannot be a wave or field that exists
in physical space, but only a wave or field in configuration space, it is in any
case unintelligible how an entity in configuration space could guide or pilot
the temporal development of entities in physical space. There is a connection
of representation, but certainly not a causal connection between configuration
2 Dowker & Herbauts (2005) propose a concrete model in which even knowledge of a limited
part of the distribution of the primitive ontology in space–time, which they take to be a GRW
flash-type ontology, allows an inference to the wavefunction with a minimal degree of error.
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space and physical space, with an entity existing in the former space piloting
entities existing in the latter space.
To put it differently, the Humean can with good reason argue that the idea
of the universal wavefunction guiding or piloting the temporal development of
matter in physical space is not part of the physics of, say, Bohmian mechanics,
but reveals a metaphysical prejudice in favour of an anti-Humean conception
of laws of nature being something that governs the behaviour of what there
is in the physical world (cf. Beebee 2000). For the Humean, the universal
wavefunction and the dynamical law that appear in a physical theory such
as Bohmian mechanics or the GRW theory are part of the best system, that
is, the system that achieves the best balance between being simple and being
informative in capturing what there is in the physical world. That system—and
everything that belongs to it—supervenes on the entire distribution of the local
matters of particular fact throughout the whole of space–time.
It is hence a coherent position to maintain that the primitive ontology is the
full ontology, in the sense that everything else—including the universal wave-
function and the law in which it figures—supervenes on the entire distribution
of the ‘local beables’ in the whole of space–time. Bell himself recognized this
position as a coherent stance in the paper in which he introduced the notion
of ‘local beables’ (1975):
One of the apparent non-localities of quantum mechanics is the instantaneous, over
all space, ‘collapse of the wave function’ on ‘measurement’. But this does not bother
us if we do not grant beable status to the wave function. We can regard it simply as
a convenient but inessential mathematical device for formulating correlations between
experimental procedures and experimental results, i.e., between one set of beables and
another. (Quoted from Bell 1987: p. 53)
Bell makes two important points in this quotation.
(1) It is not mandatory to grant beable status to the wavefunction. If one
admits ‘local beables’, one has an ontology of the physical world. Not
granting beable status to the wavefunction does, however, not commit
one to an instrumentalist attitude to the wavefunction, as Bell suggests
here. Humeanism is distinct from instrumentalism (Miller 2013: section 5
stresses this point). The Humean only has to maintain that the primitive
ontology is the full ontology, with everything else supervening on it. That is
why Humeanism is also not touched by recent claims about experimental
evidence in favour of the reality of the wavefunction (Colbeck and Renner
2012; Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph 2012): these claims only seek to rule out
the view that the wavefunction represents nothing but the information
about probabilities for measurement outcomes that is available for an
observer. However, in Humeanism, the universal wavefunction is not tied
460 MICHAEL ESFELD
to an observer: it supervenes on the entire distribution of the local matters
of particular fact in space–time. Since any experimental evidence consists
in ‘local beables’, in making that move, the Humean is in the position to
accommodate whatever experimental evidence there may be.
(2) Given that it is the wavefunction which is entangled and which correlates
‘local beables’ whatever their spatial or spatio-temporal distance is, if one
does not grant beable status to the wavefunction, there is no reason to
admit non-supervenient relations of entanglement (or of dependence or of
influence) among the ‘local beables’ over and above their occurrence at
space–time points. In being entangled, the wavefunction establishes such
correlations, but these are no addition to what there is over and above the
occurrence of the ‘local beables’ at space–time points, since the universal
wavefunction and its temporal development supervene on the entiremosaic
of these ‘local beables’.
If one does not grant beable status to the wavefunction, there is nothing that
determines the temporal development of the initial configuration of the ‘local
beables’. The particle positions simply happen to develop in such a way that
there are, as far as Bohmian quantum mechanics is concerned, continuous
particle trajectories; the matter density values just happen to develop in such
a way that the matter density takes a certain shape making true the GRW
law, and the flashes just happen to occur in such a manner that they make
true a law of the GRW type. There is nothing that drives, guides or forces
them to do so. This is, of course, an instance of the general Humean attitude
towards laws and objective modality. One may have reservations about that
attitude. But there is nothing in quantum physics that obliges one to abandon
it. In brief, it is ‘anti-Humeanism in, anti-Humeanism out’ or ‘Humeanism in,
Humeanism out’. If one takes for granted that the wavefunction is some sort
of a real entity or ‘non-local beable’ in addition to the primitive ontology, then
quantum physics comes out anti-Humean. If, by contrast, one bases oneself
on the empiricist idea that the primitive ontology is the full ontology, then one
obtains a Humean ontology of quantum physics.
The primitive ontology theories are only concerned with the position of
matter in space and its development in time. The theorems of Gleason (1957)
and Kochen & Specker (1967) among others show that it is not possible to
regard the quantum mechanical operators or observables as describing prop-
erties that the objects in nature possess, since one cannot attribute values to
these observables independently of measurement contexts. The observables
are not properties of anything. They are ways in which the quantum objects
behave in measurement contexts. The primitive ontology theories account for
the observables in terms of how the position of the objects in physical space
develops in such contexts. Consider spin: these theories explain the outcomes
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of spin measurements in terms of the temporal development of the position
of objects in physical space as described by the wavefunction. This has been
done in detail for Bohmian mechanics (see Bell 1987: ch. 4 and Norsen 2013).
There is no doubt that the same treatment is available for the GRW matter
density theory and the GRW flash theory (cf. Tumulka 2006, 2009).
Consequently, their position in space is the only property of the physical
objects in the sense that to it alone a value is attributed. All measurement
outcomes supervene on that value. The velocity of the Bohmian particles is not
anything in addition to their position, but it simply is the temporal development
of their position as given by the guiding equation. For theHumean, the guiding
equation, including the universal wavefunction that figures in it, does not
represent a property of anything over and above position either; it is a law that
supervenes on the particles’ positions throughout the whole of space–time.
However, attributing a value that indicates where the particles are in space
does not imply that position is a property that is instantiated by something.
The Bohmian particles are primitive stuff: a particle being at a space–time
point simply signifies that the point is occupied instead of empty. Accordingly,
the Bohmian particle configuration in space at any given time consists in
certain points of space being occupied at that time, whereas other points are
empty. The only difference between Bohmian particles and GRW flashes is
that in Bohmian mechanics, points of space are occupied in such a way that
the occupied points form continuous lines in time (worldlines). According to
the GRW flash theory, by contrast, points are occupied in such a way that
there are gaps in space as well as in time. Furthermore, the only difference
between Bohmian particles and GRW flashes on the one hand and the GRW
matter density on the other is that according to the latter, matter is distributed
continuously throughout space–time (there are no empty points of space–
time), with there being more matter in some regions of space–time than in
others. But the matter density simply is the density of stuff (gunk) (cf. Allori
et al. 2013: 9 and 10).
In other words, the only variation that Bohmian mechanics and the GRW
flash theory admit is the one of points of space being occupied or empty,
with there being a change in time in which points are empty and which
ones are occupied; the dynamical law, including the universal wavefunction,
is the description of that change which achieves the best balance between
being simple and being informative. The only variation that the GRWmatter
density theory admits is the one of there being more stuff in some regions of
space than in others, with there being a change in time in which regions of
space there is more and in which ones there is less stuff; the dynamical law,
including the universal wavefunction, is the description of that change which
achieves the best balance between being simple and being informative.
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Hence, these theories are primitive ontology theories in yet another sense:
they are committed to matter being primitive stuff distributed in space and a
law for the temporal development of that distribution. In brief, the primitive
ontology also is primitive in the sense that it consists in primitive stuff. The stuff
is primitive, because it does not have any properties. It simply is distributed in
space, with its distribution varying in time. More precisely, the stuff does not
have any physical or natural properties, given a sparse conception of properties
that does not take predicates as a guideline for properties. Of course, one may
attribute to the stuff ‘properties’ such as the ones of being stuff or being matter
and of being self-identical and the like. However, ascribing such ‘properties’
to the stuff does not cut any ontological ice: it does not add anything to saying
that there is primitive stuff distributed in space. For instance, endorsing such
properties does not yield properties in the sense of ways of being of the stuff
(cf. the ontology of sparse properties as ways of being of substances advocated
by Heil 2012: chs 4 and 5).
Instead of attributing properties to matter, one could contemplate con-
ceiving these primitive ontology theories in the framework of super-
substantivalism, according to which space–time is the only substance and
matter a property of space–time: space–time points have the property of being
occupied or being empty. However, it is doubtful how being occupied or being
empty could be a bona fide property of space–time points, with the metrical
properties as treated in general relativity theory setting the paradigm for what
a bona fide property of space–time points is. Saying that space–time points
have the property of being occupied or being empty amounts to what Sklar
(1974: 166, 222 and 223) calls a linguistic trick, instead of vindicating super-
substantivalism as a serious ontological position in the framework of primitive
ontology theories of quantum physics. In brief, being occupied or being empty
does not look like a property of anything, at least not on a sparse conception of
properties. Being occupied signifies that there is something at the space–time
point in question (namely stuff), whereas being empty signifies that there is
nothing at the point in question.
Consequently, applying Humeanism to the primitive ontology theories of
quantum physics after all entails a modification of Lewis’s Humean ontology:
the mosaic of local matters of particular fact does not consist in ‘local qual-
ities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a
point at which to be instantiated’ (Lewis 1986: x). There are no such qualities
or intrinsic properties in quantum physics. Quantum entanglement rules out
that such properties could do any work as far as the features that are spe-
cific for quantum physics are concerned. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement
notwithstanding, Lewis’s thesis of Humean supervenience can be literally true
in quantum physics, as the primitive ontology theories show. The only adap-
tation that is necessary to obtain this result is that the mosaic of local matters
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of particular fact is not constituted by local qualities occurring at space–time
points, but by space–time points being occupied by primitive stuff or being
empty.
This adaptation does not change anything as far as Humean supervenience
is concerned, since what does all the work for the Humean supervenience
thesis is that there is—only—a mosaic of local matters of particular fact.
Conceiving that mosaic in terms of qualitative, intrinsic properties does not
do any work, because the qualitative nature of these properties is in any case a
pure quality, known as a quiddity. Consequently, we cannot have any epistemic
access to such pure qualities. This consequence is known as humility. Lewis
(2009) endorses both quidditism and humility, but these commitments put a
rather heavy burden on Humeanism, in particular given that Humeanism sees
itself as a metaphysics that is close to science and empiricism, avoiding any
sort of occult metaphysics (see notably Black 2000 against quidditism). The
mosaic of localmatters of particular fact is needed as the supervenience basis for
everything: it makes true laws and causal statements as well as all the functional
descriptions of what there is in the world, captured in the Ramsey sentence
of the world. That sentence quantifies over the whole distribution of local
matters of particular fact in space–time, with that distribution realizing all the
functions that are there in the world. But a mosaic of local matters of particular
fact consisting in certain space–time points being occupied whereas others are
empty can do so in the same way as a mosaic of local matters of particular
fact consisting in pure qualities occurring at space–time points: it can make
true laws—and thereby causal statements—as shown above. Furthermore,
whatever functions there are in the world can be realized by configurations
of primitive stuff that implement a variation consisting in certain space–time
points being occupied, whereas others are empty. If a priori physicalism is
true, then if one had complete knowledge of which space–time points are
occupied throughout the whole of space–time, one could deduce from that
knowledge a priori all the true statements about what there is in the world.
In a nutshell, thus, applying Humeanism to the primitive ontology theories of
quantum physics amounts to physicalism without properties.
III. HUMEANISM AND THE PRIMITIVE ONTOLOGY
OF CLASSICAL MECHANICS
The term ‘primitive ontology’ has been introduced in the context of quan-
tum physics. Nonetheless, primitive ontology theories apply wherever physics
applies. By the same token, the combination of Humeanism and primitive
ontology theories, resulting in physicalism without properties, is a live option
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not only for quantum physics, but also for physics in general. Consider classi-
cal mechanics: again, atoms in the sense of Newtonian particles are primitive
stuff. A particle being at a point in space at a certain time signifies that the
point is occupied instead of empty. All the variation that there is in time is
a change in which points of space are occupied and which ones are empty
as time passes. Again, that change is such that there are continuous lines of
occupation (worldlines interpreted as particle trajectories).
The laws that describe that change include variables standing for mass and
charge, which are commonly regarded as intrinsic properties of the particles.
Indeed, mass and charge are the paradigm examples of ‘local qualities: per-
fectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at
which to be instantiated’ (Lewis 1986: p. x). Given the distribution of mass and
charge in space (plus certain constants such as the gravitational constant), the
trajectories of the particles are fixed by the laws of classical mechanics. No
further ontological commitment to forces or fields is necessary. However, mass
and charge are admitted in classical mechanics only because they perform a
certain function as described by the laws of gravitation and electromagnetism,
namely to accelerate the particles in a certain manner. For a Humean, it is
contingent that mass and charge exercise that functional role in the actual
world. That they do so is by no means essential to them, but supervenes on the
mosaic of local matters of particular fact as a whole, that is, the distribution
of mass and charge qua local qualities throughout the whole of space–time.
However, the qualitative nature of mass and charge does not do any job in
Humeanism: it is a pure quality (quiddity) to which we moreover have no
epistemic access (humility).
Hence, assuming that the mosaic of local matters of particular fact consists
in the instantiation of qualitative, intrinsic properties at space–time points
does not do any job in Humeanism applied to classical mechanics either. It is
sufficient for the purpose of having a Humean supervenience basis to maintain
that the mosaic of local matters of particular fact consists in some points of
space–time being occupied, whereas others are empty. In short, a variation in
the sense of some points of space being occupied whereas others are empty
(primitive stuff) with a change in time in which points are occupied and which
ones are empty is sufficient to constitute themosaic of localmatters of particular
fact that serves as a supervenience basis for everything on Humeanism—in a
world in which classical mechanics is the fundamental physical theory as well
as in a quantum world.
Of course, if one assumes that there is something in nature that determines
the temporal development of the primitive stuff, then one is committed in
classical mechanics to particles being not only primitive stuff, but instantiating
properties such as mass and charge, with it then being essential for these
properties to accelerate the particles as described by the laws of gravitation
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and electromagnetism. But if one sides with the Humean in maintaining that
there is nothing in nature which carries out such a determination, there is
no need for a commitment to these properties being instantiated in nature in
addition to facts about which space–time points are occupied and which ones
are empty (see Hall unpublished: section 5.2). There is a mass variable and
a charge variable in the laws of gravitation and electromagnetism. However,
these laws and everything that figures in them supervene on the mosaic of local
matters of particular fact throughout the whole of space–time. They do not
refer to anything that exists in nature over and above that mosaic, which can
simply consist in some space–time points being occupied by primitive stuff and
others being empty. In other words, given the laws, one can attribute properties
like mass and charge to the primitive stuff—that is, the particles in classical
mechanics. But the particles do not have these properties per se, as something
essential or intrinsic to them. They obtain them only through the regularities
that the distribution of primitive stuff throughout the whole of space and time
exhibits.
To put the issue in terms of truth-makers, the distribution of primitive
stuff throughout space and time makes true all the true propositions about
the world, including in particular the propositions expressing laws of nature.
Hence, if the laws of classical mechanics figure in the best system, predicates
such as ‘mass’ and ‘charge’ apply to the particles in virtue of the patterns
that the particle trajectories in space and time exhibit. These predicates—as
well as all the other ones appearing in the propositions that are true about
the world—really apply, and the propositions really are true; there is nothing
fictitious about them. But what there is—and hence what makes them true—is
nothing over and above the distribution of primitive stuff throughout space
and time.
By the same token, when it comes to quantum physics, if one assumes that
there is something in nature that determines, guides or pilots the temporal
development of the primitive stuff, then one is committed to the wavefunction
being or representing a real entity in nature over and above the local matters
of particular fact that carries out such a determination or guidance. But if one
sides with the Humean in rejecting that assumption, then there is not only
no need, but also no possibility either to maintain that the wavefunction is
or represents a real entity in nature, since doing so would destroy Humean
supervenience. The only difference between classical and quantummechanics
in that respect is that in classical mechanics, the Humean can afford the luxury
of taking variables such as mass and charge to refer to intrinsic properties that
are instantiated in nature, provided that these properties are stripped off the
functional role that they play in the laws of classical mechanics being essential
to them. In quantum mechanics, by contrast, the Humean can no longer
afford such a luxury with respect to the wavefunction.
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However, as far as physics is concerned, both variables such as mass and
charge on the one hand and the wavefunction on the other only enter the
physics through the role they play in the dynamical laws that describe the
temporal development of the distribution of matter in space. Therefore, as far
as metaphysics is concerned, the Humean has in neither case a cogent reason
to commit herself to such variables representing anything in nature over and
above how primitive stuff is distributed in space–time. Quantum mechanics,
by ruling out that the wavefunction could be or represent a local quality, merely
reveals an option that was there all the time, namely the option of an ontology
that subscribes only to a commitment to primitive stuff—in short, physicalism
without properties.
Generally speaking, a Humean supervenience basis being constituted by
the distribution of primitive stuff throughout the whole of space–time (vari-
ation of occupied and unoccupied space–time points) is as unassailable as a
metaphysical thesis can be: it is sufficient as a supervenience basis for all the
possible empirical evidence for a physical theory, since all that evidence con-
sists in how matter is distributed in space–time (cf. Bell 1987: p. 166). More
precisely, a variationmade up by some space–time points being occupied while
others are empty is the most simple supervenience basis that is sufficient to
ground all the possible empirical evidence. It arguably also is necessary as a
supervenience basis for any empirical evidence, given that it is not at all clear
how empirical evidence consisting in the distribution of matter in space–time
could supervene on a basis that is not spatio-temporal. All the difference be-
tween the physical theories then boils down to a difference about the variables
that have to enter into the best system, that is, the system that achieves the
best balance between being simple and being informative in describing the
distribution of the primitive stuff in the space–time of the actual world. By way
of consequence, contrary to what the position known as epistemic structural
realism claims (Worrall 1989), there is continuity in the ontology of physics, but
change in the structure of the fundamental physical theories in the history of
modern science; this continuity obtains because there is no reason to subscribe
to the idea of an—inaccessible—intrinsic nature of the physical objects.
Apart from the metrical relations among space–time points and the occu-
pation of some of these points by primitive stuff, the Humean is free to assign to
all theoretical entities a place in the system achieving the best balance between
simplicity and informativeness—starting with mass and charge in classical me-
chanics and continuing with the wavefunction in quantum mechanics. That
treatment can surely be extended to whatever theoretical entities physical the-
ories going beyond quantum mechanics may introduce: the justification for
admitting these entities precisely consists in the fact that they increase the bal-
ance between simplicity and informativeness in capturing the distribution of
matter in space–time. Of course, space–time (the network of spatio-temporal
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relations among points) may itself be a dynamical entity, as assumed in the
general theory of relativity, instead of constituting a passive background, as
assumed in classical and in quantum mechanics. Humeanism can accommo-
date a dynamical space–time in the following manner: considering an initial
configuration consisting in metrical relations between space–time points and
some of these points being occupied by primitive stuff, the further development
of the metrical relations depends on how the stuff is distributed in that initial
configuration.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to establish two conclusions—one for Humeanism and
one for the metaphysics of quantum physics—as well as a general moral. As far
as Humeanism is concerned, far from refuting Humeanism, quantum physics
strengthens Humeanism in obliging the Humean to abandon the ornament of
the local matters of particular fact being endowed with qualities in the sense
of qualitative, intrinsic properties. They are just primitive stuff, in the sense
of the fact that some points of space–time are occupied, whereas others are
empty. Doing away with that ornament removes the stock objections against
Humeanism from quidditism and humility. The debate on Humeanism can
thus focus on the central issue of whether or not there are cogent reasons for a
commitment to objectivemodality in the sense of, as far as physics is concerned,
there being something in nature that drives, guides or enforces a certain
temporal development of matter, by contrast to a certain such development
simply happening to occur.
Furthermore, as far as the metaphysics of quantum physics is concerned,
the physics—that is, the empirical evidence for quantum entanglement and
quantum non-locality—by no means commits us to subscribe to either one of
the following two consequences: to admit that non-supervenient relations or
irreducible structures are instantiated in nature or, if one shrinks from such a
commitment, to endorse the view that the extremely high dimensional config-
uration space of the universe is the realm of physical reality, with everything
being local in that space. As far as the empirical evidence is concerned, one
can simply stay with a primitive ontology of local matters of particular fact
consisting in the distribution of primitive stuff in ordinary space. This conclu-
sion holds not only for quantum mechanics, but also for any other physical
theory, as long as measurement outcomes consist in ‘local beables’. Again, the
point at issue is whether or not there are cogent reasons for a commitment
to there being something in nature that determines, guides or enforces the
temporal development of matter. If so, one either has to go for non-locality in
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the sense of there being non-local entities such as non-supervenient relations
or irreducible structures being instantiated in ordinary space–time, or, if one
wishes to stay local, pay the price of regarding configuration space instead
of four-dimensional space–time as the realm of physical reality.3 But if the
Humean is right, there is no need to go either of these ways.
The general moral of these considerations is this one: since the attack by
Ladyman & Ross (2007: ch. 1) on mainstream analytic metaphysics, there
is a tendency in metaphysics of science to oppose what is called scientific
or naturalized metaphysics to analytic metaphysics. For instance, in a paper
that has the intention to mark the contrast between scientific and speculative
ontology, Humphreys (2013) scorns Humean supervenience in these terms:
As an exercise in theorizing, Lewis’s attitude would be unobjectionable were the position
seriously put to an empirical test. But it has not in the sense that science long ago showed
that Humean supervenience is factually false. The claim that the physical world has a
form that fits the constraints of Humean supervenience is incompatible with well-known
and well-confirmed theoretical knowledge about the non-separability of fermions. It
was empirically established before Lewis’s position was developed that entangled states
in quantum mechanics exist and do not supervene on what would in classical cases
be called the states of the components. This feature of our world is sufficiently well
confirmed as to make Humean supervenience untenable. (Humphreys 2013: 56 and 57)
However, as the argument in this paper has made clear, it is an illusion to think
that physics in itself can refute a metaphysical stance such as Humeanism. Of
course, physics and metaphysics go together in the enquiry into the constitu-
tion of the world, but there is no neopositivist one-way road from physics to
metaphysics that would enable one to read metaphysical conclusions directly
off from physical theories and experiments.
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